INTRODUCTION
The statistical décision problem is concerned with the choice among several courses of action, the conséquence of which dépends upon the state of nature. The available information about the true state usually permits to specify a prior distribution on the state space. In addition, the person responsible for the choice (décision maker) can evaluate the gain of taking each action, when a concrete state is arisen, by defining a utility function.
On the other hand, to obtain further information about the true state the décision maker may select a single experiment from a set of potential experiments, for which the distributions depend upon the state of nature.
Such a sélection is accomplished by Raiffa and Schlaifer [19] following an extensive-form analysis in which the optimal actions are elected by using Bayes principle, and then having recourse to this choice to compare the pairs of experiments through the "expected value of sample information (E.V.S.I.)".
Nevertheless, the comparison above leads in some situations to indifférence between the experiments in a pair. To avoid this indifférence, a mixed criterion is formulated, Gil M.A. [10] . In this criterion, an optimal action is choosen after an experiment has already been performed by following the Bayes principle and, on the basis of this choice, a préférence relation is stated consisting of considering preferred or indifferent the experiment in each pair which first exhibites more E.V.S.I. and then, if the indifférence has happened, pro vides more "expected quietness".
However, this mixed criterion can be only applied provided that a unique Bayes action exists (with respect to both, the prior and the posterior distribution) or provided that the actions having the same prior (posterior) expected utility in volve the same prior (posterior) unquietness.
The aim of the present paper is to leave out the last constraints by defining a new principle of choice. This principle can be described as follows: we first consider the set of Bayes actions with respect to the prior and posterior distributions on the state space, and then select inside an action providing the smallest unquietness. On the basis of that principle we state a préférence relation with a similar structure to that of the mixed criterion. Remark 1.1: The concept of "expected quietness of sample information", introduced below, is based on the unquietness measure, [9] . The entropy associated with the observation of a random variable is a measure of the uncertainty which is removed by revealing the observed value of the variable. In [21] A. M. Yaglom and I. M. Yaglom emphasize that "...entropy cannot lay claim to take into account all factors determining the uncertainty of an COMPARING EXPERIMENTS 261 experiment in every sense in which it may be encountered in real life. Thus, entropy dépends only on the probabilities of the possible values of the variable but in no way dépends on what these values are, whether they are in a certain sense "close" to or quite "remote" from each other..." (that is, it does not pay attention to the different nature of the variable values). In order to take into account the nature of each of the variable values, we first quantify this nature by means of certain valuation, called utility. Then, unquietness measures are introduced as measures of the uncertainty which is motivated by the variety of utilities (that is, by the variety in the nature or quality of the variable values), bef ore revealing the value of the variable.
The measure in [9] belongs to the family of "inset entropies of the Shannon type", [1] . J. Aczél, [1] , points our that"... in order to define measures of uncertainty including probabilities and utilities, it is worthwhile looking at these measures as inset entropies". The suitability of the considered measure in quantifying the unquietness associated with a random variable where the possible values are known as probabilities and present different utilities, has been corroborated by an exhaustive study and characterization, [9] . On the other hand, the unquietness measure above coincides with the "additively decomposable index of order 0" for evaluating the income inequality of a population, [5, 6, 7, 20, 22] .
PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
The following are the four basic éléments in the considered décision problem:
-the state space G>.
-the action space A.
-the set of potential experiments, E. An experiment X belonging to E can be represented as a probability space (X, ^x, P e ) where (X, & x ) is a measurable space and the probability measure P Q belongs to a specified family {F e , 6e©} (that is, from X the outcomes in X can be obtained with a distribution depending on the true state).
-a positive utility évaluation, u (6, a), defined on O x A. This évaluation quantifies the gain allocated to the conséquence of taking each action a in A, when each particular 0 in G) is the true state of nature. In order to avoid difficulties it is often supposed that u(6, a) and log u(6, a) are bounded &-measurable and ^x-measurable functions of 6 for each a (whatever XeE may be, and being ^ a a-field on O). In addition, and in order to deal with a less restrained framework, we assume that the utility évaluation in the present problem is not necessarily defined satisfying the classical Von Neumann-Morgenstern axiomatic System. Moreover, we assume the existence of a fifth element: -a. prior probability measure TC(0) defined on a measurable space (0, «^"), being & a a-field of subsets. Let /?(6) designate the prior density of n (9) with respect to a cr-finite measure on 0.
Usually, we suppose that O is a subset in a euclidean space and ïF is the smallest Borel a-field on 0, as well as, for each experiment X in E, X is a subset in a euclidean space and & x is the smallest Borel a-field on X.
If ƒ (x; 9) désignâtes the density function of P e with respect to a a-finite measure on X, the conditional measures P e along with the prior probability measure n on 0 détermine two other probability measures:
-the marginal measure P on X described by a density function ƒ (x), given by:
a. s. (with respect to the a-finite measure on X) (the intégral being according to the Lebesgue-Stieltjes sense).
-the posterior probability measure on 0 given xeX, n x (9), described by a density function p(0/x), given by: a. s. (with respect to the a-finite measure on X).
We now recall certain well-known définitions:
The expected utility of the action aeA is defined as the value:
The expected utility of the action aeA given the outcome is defined as the value:
Following a similar structure, we next introducé two new définitions: DÉFINITION 
PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE
Because of the extensive form adopted to analyze the available data, the essence of the present paper lies first in the principle introduced for the choice of the action to be taken, before, and after a particular outcome has been observed (terminal analysis).
For an experiment X = (X, & x , P e ), 0 e®, that principle is decribed as follows:
If the prior probability measure n on © is such that the set of prior Bayes actions, A o = { a 0 e A/u (a 0 ) = maxu (a) }, is not empty and for almost all xeX aeA the posterior probability measure K X on © is such that the set of posterior Bayes actions given x, A x = {a x eA/u(aJx) = maxu(a/x)}, is not empty, we aeA can state following définitions: Remark 3.2: From an intuitive viewpoint, the stated principle will be adopted by a décision maker with a "risk aversion" (or inequality aversion, in économies terms) behavior, since the concavity of the unquietness measure with respect to the utilities. Thus, in the present principle the risk aversion is not necessarily described by the shape of the utility évaluation (since it is defined without restrictions), but rather this aversion is incorporated by means of the introduction of the unquietness.
On the basis of définitions 3. 1 and 3.2 we now proceed to recall an essential concept and to introducé a new one:
The expected value of sample information (E.V.S.I.) of a given experiment X G E is defined as the value, if exists:
[when we must specify the prior distribution on 0, we shall note V(0; X; n) instead of V(0; X)]. DÉFINITION 
3.4:
The expected quietness of sample information of a given experiment X G E is defined as the value, if exists:
Jx

Q(O; X) = HU*(a$)-f HU* (a*/x)dP(x) J
(when we must specify the prior distribution on 0, we shall note Q (0; X; n) instead of Q(0; X)).
COMPARING EXPERIMENTS
We now proceed to define a préférence relation in order to select the experiment which is to be performed (preposterior analysis).
In the preceding décision problem, let X and Y be two potential experiments in E:
We Remark 4.1: The préférence relation above proposed establishes a comparison between two experiments in E with respect to a prior distribution on 0, and hence it détermines a complete preordering on E. Nevertheless, the experiments belonging to E could be compared, in a similar way, without référence to a prior distribution, even though in this case the préférence relation would only détermine a partial preordering on E.
Remark 4.2: On the other hand, it is worth noting that the exposed comparison [which establishes a lexicographical preordering on the set of all pairs (V(0; X), Q(0; X)), where X belongs to E] will be adopted again by a décision maker with a "risk aversion" behaviour.
IIXUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
To illustrate the interest of the present paper we first expose an example in which the E.V.S.I. criterion is unable to compare certain experiments:
An old machine produces pièces so that it behaves as a Bernoulli process with known fraction defective q o = l-p oSome experiments with a similar new machine lead to the assignment of a uniform prior distribution on the unit interval, P, to its unknown fraction defective q = 1 -p (and, consequently, to the unknown p). The sale price of a good pièce is c t (>0) if the pièce has been produced by the old machine, and c 2 >c x in the other case. A lot of size N is to be generated and bef ore it is produced a décision maker can either adopt the old machine (action a x ) or adopt the new machine (action a 2 ). If the décision maker considers the utilities: Therefore, the E.V.S.I. criterion does not allow for a discrimination between the experiments above.
The application of concepts and the criterion in Section 4 is now to be illustrated by breaking the indifférence situation which arises for these particular conditions.
Following notations in the preceding section, we have: In this way, from the criterion in Section 4 the binomial sampling of size 2 is regarded as better than the Pascal sampling.
PROPERTIES OF THE COMPARISON
In order to investigate the suitability of the préférence relation in the last section, it would be désirable to carry out a research following the study for the relation based on the expérimental amount of information, developed by Lindley [18] .
For this purpose, we first recall certain concepts: DÉFINITION 6. 1: An experiment from which the outcomes can be (almost surely) obtained with a distribution irrespective of the state, is called null experiment. DÉFINITION 6.2: If X 1 =(X 1 , @ Xl , P£) and X 2 =(X 2 , ^X 2 , Pj) are experimerits belonging to E, the combined experiment, or sum experiment, corresponds to an experiment X 1 xX 2 = (I 1 xI 2 , J XlXl2 , P e ) belonging to E, where & x . is the a-field over X t induced from é% Xl xx 2 by the projection of index i(i= 1, 2), and P l Q is the probability measure on 3$ x . from P e , (i= 1, 2). Particularly, the experiment X (m) = XxXx...xX (mtlme^ = (r, é# x m, Pg»>), m e N, is called random sample of size m from X. DÉFINITION 6.3: Let X x xX 2 be the combination, or sum, of two experiments X t and X 2 , belonging to E.X X and X 2 are said to be independent experiments if and only if the probability measure on Xi x X 2 , P e , is the product measure of the marginal probability measures PQ and PQ, on X x and X 2 , respectively. In the assumed framework, the sufficiency is equivalent to the Bayesian sufficiency, where: 270 M. A. GIL, J. M. A GARRIDO, P GIL Then, X>*N, whatever the prior distribution on © may be.
• Theorem 6. 1 allows the following interprétation: Any experiment is preferred or indifferent to an experiment which does not provide statistical information pertinent to the state space. THEOREM whatever the prior distribution on © may be.
Proof: If P, P ± and P 2 are the "marginal" probability measures on X ± x X 2 , X x and X 2 , respectively, we have:
and, when V(©; X x xX 2 )=V(©; X t ) 9 and, thus, V(0; X, xX 2 )=V(0; X t ) and Q(0; X 1 xX 2 ) = Q(0; XJ. Then:
whatever the prior distribution on © may be.
• Theorem 6.2 can be explained as follows: it is preferred or indifferent to perform two experiments than to perform one of them. In addition, when one of them cannot add statistical information about the state space to what is contained in the other experiment, it is indifferent to perform both experiments than to perform only the last one. (being P 2 the marginal probability measure on Y 2 , determined by PQ and the prior distribution n on 0, and being n y2 the posterior probability measure on 0 given y 2 e F 2 )-Proof: If P is the marginal probability measure on Y x x Y 2 determined by the probability measure P e on the sum experiment, when n is the prior distribution on G), we have: We turn now to the proof of Theorem 6.3. Applying the lemma above, the assumptions in the theorem yields: V (0; X ± x X 2 ; TC) = V (®; X 2 ; TC) + f V (0; X ± ; n X2 ) dP 2 (x 2 ) Jx 2 V (0; X 3 x X 2 ; TC) = V (0; X 2 ; TC) + f V (0; X 3 ; n X2 ) dP 2 
(x 2 )
Jx 2 Q (0; X ± x X 2 ; TC) = Q (0; X 2 ; TC) + f Q (0; X x ; TC, 2 ) dP 2 (x 2 ) Jx 2 Q (0; X 3 x X 2 ; TC) = Q (9; X 2 ; TC) + f Q (0; X 3 ; TC X2 ) dP 2 (x 2 ) Jx 2
(being P 2 the marginal probability measure on X 2 determined by Pf, when n is the prior distribution 0, and being n X2 the posterior distribution on 0 given x 2 e X 2 ). From X 1 >*X 3 , for all prior distribution on 0, two situations can be arisen:
-or there is a non null set in X 2 such that V(0; Xj_; n X2 ) >V(0; X 3 ; n X2 ) holds when x 2 is any element in that set, and V(0; X ± ; 7i X2 )=V(0; X 3 ; n X2 ) otherwise, which entails: V (0; X x x X 2 ; TC) > V (0; X 3 x X 2 ; TC) -or else, V(0; X ± ; 7i X2 )=V(0; X 3 ; TC X2 ) holds for almost all x 2 eX 2 , and then Q(0; X x ; TI X2 )^Q(0; X 3 ; n X2 ) for almost all x 2 el 2 , which implies: Then, X 1 xX 2 >%xX 2 , whatever the prior distribution on 0 may be.
• We interpret Theorem 6. 3 as saying that the préférence relation between two experiments is preserved when each of them is combined with an experiment independent of both of them. ) = Q(©; T ) whatever the prior distribution on 0 may be.
• Theorem 6. 5 can be interpreted as follows: any statistic entails a réduction of the original random sample, implying a loss of information about the state space, so that this random sample is preferred or indifferent to the statistic. In addition, any sufficient statistic exhausts all the information about the state space that is contained in the original random sample, so that this random sample is indifferent to the sufficient statistic. whatever the prior distribution on 0 may be.
•
CONTRAST WITH PREVIOUS CRITERIA FOR COMPARING EXPERIMENTS
The properties in the preceding section have been also verified for previous criteria in the comparison of experiments. Thus, the criteria given by Blackwell [2] , Bohnenblust, Shapley and Shermann [2] , Lindley [18] , Lehmann [17] , and Raiffa and Schlaifer [19] , satisfy similar properties. In this sensé, a parallel study for the five criteria was developed in [8] .
On the other hand, the contrast of the criterion in Section 4 with the previous ones leads to the following conclusions (whose proofs are similar to those in [10] 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Firstly, it is worth emphasizing that the effectiveness of the unquietness measure in Remark 1. 1 will be greater if the utility évaluation has been accomplished by paying attention to the ratios between the utilities (because of its invariance by homotheties with respect to them) and this fact permits us to consider them as positive values. In addition, a similar criterion could be stated by using the variance of the utility scheme for measuring the unquietness (Gil M.A. [12] ). This criterion satisfies the properties in Section 6 and is sometimes more operative than the criterion herein proposed (thus, the effectiveness of the new cirterion will be greater if the utility évaluation has been accomplished by paying attention to the différences between the utilities). Nevertheless, the asymmetry in the concave function ƒ (x) = -Ln x (in comparison with the symmetry in the concave function ƒ (x) = x 2 ) allows for a major discrimination power in favour of the unquietness measure in Remark 1. 1 and, consequently, in favour of the criterion in Section 4. On the other hand, and according to the shape of the utility évaluation and the probability distributions in the problem, we can alternatively make use of some of the unquietness measures of order (3 (which coincide respectively with the additively decomposable indices of order l-(3 for measuring the income inequality of a population, [5, 6, 7, 20, 22] ).
Secondly, from an economie viewpoint, an interesting criterion could be stated by reversing the priority in the lexicographical preordering in both, the principle of choice and the préférence relation. Properties in Section 6 would be immediately satisfied by this new procedure. Moreover, instead of these lexicographical preorderings, other natural alternative criteria would be vol. 21, n° 3, août 1987 déterminée by some sort of weighted combination of the expected utility and the unquietness in the principle of choice, and a similar combination of the expected value and quietness in the préférence relation. Particularly, a comparison between two potential experiments have been established in [11] on the basis of the unquietness and expected quietness.
Finally, the optimality principle and the préférence relation in this paper may be extended to the fuzzy décision problem, in which the décision maker only perceives fuzzy information from the expérimental observation. In such a sense, several methods have been extended (for instance, Gil M.A. et ah [13, 14, 15] ).
